Re: TLSv1.3 supprt for 2.4.x?
Speaking of SSL and rare renegotiation setups: Bernard and me are suspecting that
libressl has issues here for quite some time. At least it looks that way:
Just FYI in case someone encounters such things.
> Am 03.09.2018 um 13:32 schrieb Stefan Eissing <stefan.eissing@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
>> Am 03.09.2018 um 13:19 schrieb Joe Orton <jorton@xxxxxxxxxx>:
>> On Mon, Sep 03, 2018 at 11:17:39AM +0200, Stefan Eissing wrote:
>>> Dear SSL care takers and stake holders,
>>> trunk has TLSv1.3 support for some time. I just now changed the 'all' SSLProtocol selection, so that it does not include TLSv1.3. This means that in order to enable it, admins must add an explicit '+TLSv1.3' to their config (same for SSLProxyProtocl of course).
>>> With this, the added support is really an opt-in and we could backport it to 2.4.x, if we want. We have been burned with backporting SSL features just recently (by my mistake), so I would understand that people feel a bit reluctant here. On the other hand, there is certainly interest by users.
>>> So, what is your opinion?
>> Yes, I just worked on a backport of that set for Fedora, so I'm on board
>> for pushing & testing that in 2.4.x. Possibly warrants a branch to work
>> through the merge?
> We could do that. The patch, right now, is not that large, I think, but
> a branch does not hurt.
>>> PS. There are some combinations in renegotiation/client certs that are
>>> not tested well. Therefore, '+TLSv1.3' should be tagged as
>>> 'experimental' or at least with a heavy caveat for those setups. But I
>>> see no issue with using it for plain-vanilla https: setups.
>> AIUI the various bits of new API added for TLS/1.3 are not necessarily
>> stable until there is a final OpenSSL 1.1.1 release, so maybe we should
>> wait for that first?
> I think they (or at least the parts we use) have been stable since pre3 in
> spring. There have been fixes under the hood in timing of callbacks, AFAIK.
> Since none of these are in any public part of httpd - apart from the
> protocol config which we alaways be there - I think we could broaden the
> test audience without much risk.
>> IMO there is no problem with supporting it by default (not needing
>> explicit +TLSv1.3) in 2.4. Since "bleeding edge OpenSSL" is needed to
>> enable it at build time, this isn't going to break production users on
>> current systems.
> Interesting. If that is consensus, I'd revert my change from earlier today.
> Cheers, Stefan
>> Regards, Joe